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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
BANK OF SALT LAKE, a Utah 
corporation, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
CORPORATION OF THE 
PRESIDENT OF THE CHURCH 
OF JESUS CHRIST OF LATTER-
DAY SAINTS, a Utah 
corporation sole, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE 
OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff-respondent seeks money damages against 
defendant-appellant arising out of the failure of the latter 
to pay the former pursuant to certain alleged collateral 
assignments in its favor. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Plaintiff-respondent was awarded judgment in the 
amount of $59,205.80, interest and costs, pursuant to its 
complaint as amended at trial over objections of defend-
ant-appellant. 
Case No. 
13704 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant-appellant seeks a complete reversal of 
the trial court's judgment against it and prays that this 
Court grant judgment in its favor, no cause of action as 
to all claims of plaintiff-respondent; in the event this 
Court does not grant a reversal, defendant-appellant seeks 
appropriate modification of the Judgment in accordance 
with the Argument infra. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This action arises out of certain transactions and sur-
rounding circumstances, which occurred during 1968 and 
1969 by and among the plaintiff, Bank of Salt Lake (some-
times "Bank"), Kerry-Aldon, Inc., and Leland Ronald 
Bruderer ("Bruderer"), at that time a low-level employee 
in the office of the department of Seminars and Institutes 
of the Church Schools, a division of The Church of Jesus 
Christ of Latter-day Saints, an unincorporated association 
(Church). (R. 100-105, 109, 110, 111, 113, 114, 197). Dur-
ing the latter part of 1968 and early 1969, the Church was 
purchasing various manufacturers' lines of school furni-
ture and fixtures from, among others, Kerry-Aldon, Inc. 
The plaintiff was, at least in part, financing the operation 
of Kerry-Aldon, Inc., as it had the operation of Kerry-
Aldon Associates, the partnership through which Kerry 
Rapp and Aldon Cook had done business prior to the 
incorporation of Kerry-Aldon, Inc. in June, 1968. Among 
the receivables assigned as security for some of the promis-
sory notes by Kerry-Aldon, Inc., and one or more of the 
officers of said corporation, to Bank were payments due on 
2 
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certain invoices representing items of school furniture and 
fixtures sold to various departments of the Church. 
In connection with each of the subject transactions 
form letters were prepared by plaintiff addressed to Mr. 
Leland Bruderer, Seminaries and Institutes, LDS Church, 
Union Pacific Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111. (R. 
46-49) Bruderer was selected as the addressee of these 
letters by the plaintiff solely on the advice of Mr. Aldon 
Cook, a principal in Kerry-Aldon, Inc., who, at the request 
of Plaintiff, hand delivered these letters to Mr. Bruderer, 
one letter having been brought to him at his home on a 
Sunday. (R. 46-49; 171). One of these letters, which was 
signed by an Assistant Vice President of the Bank, con-
tained, inter alia, the following language below the Bank 
officer's signature: 
Seminaries and Institutes, LDS Church, hereby 
acknowledges the indebtedness described above 
and agrees to the assignment consenting to make 
all disbursements on the above invoices payable to 
the Bank of Salt Lake and Kerry-Aldon Associates, 
jointly, and to mail such disbursements to the Bank 
of Salt Lake, 3081 South State, Salt Lake City, Utah. 
Seminaries and Institutes, LDS Church 
By: / s / Leland R. Bruderer 
Title 
Budget and Records Offices 
(Exhibit 5-P-C-) 
This language was representative of that portion of 
all letters below the Bank's signature, except that the 
first acknowledgement did not indicate Bruderer's title. 
(Exhibit 2-P-C; see Exhibits 2-P-C through 5-P-C). 
3 
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The body of each of these letters misrepresented that 
credit had ben extended to Kerry-Aldon Associates by the 
Bank of Salt Lake and that in consideration therefor Kerry-
Aldon Associates had assigned the proceeds of certain 
invoices. (R. 158-159) 
As directed by plaintiff, Mr. Cook personally deliver-
ed each of these letters to Mr. Bruderer, obtained his signa-
ture on the acknowledgment, and returned each letter to 
the plaintiff. (R. 46-49; 171). 
Bruderer indicated that he signed the acknowleg-
ments with the understanding that Cook would send 
through the "assigned" invoices to the appropriate Church 
department with the names of Kerry-Aldon Inc. and the 
Bank on them. Bruderer indicated to Cook at the time he 
signed them that he (Bruderer) had no authority to sign 
the acknowledgments and Cook, according to Bruderer, 
well knew at that time that he had no authority to sign 
the acknowledgments. (R. 104, 105) Cook further stated 
that the invoices when presented would have the name of 
the Bank on them for payment. (R. 104, 105). At no time 
did anyone on behalf of the Bank, except Cook, contact 
Bruderer or anyone else who worked for the Church nor 
did anyone ever contact any representative of Corporation 
of the President of The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-
day Saints, a Utah corporation sole, the defendant in this 
action (Corporation of the President). (R. 105, 108, 168) 
At the time of these "acknowledgments" Bruderer 
was a low-level employee of the Seminaries and Institutes 
Department of the Church Educational System. The only 
4 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
employees working under him then were a full-time secre-
tary and, later, a part-time secretary. (R. 100) There were 
numerous men above him in the hierarchy of the Seminar-
ies and Institutes Department, and additional persons in 
the Church Educational System. (R. 113, 114, 195, 196) 
His duties were largely clerical. He obtained basic factual 
payroll information from seminary and institute teachers. 
He also filled out requisition forms from requests by semi-
naries or institutes, some types of which requests were 
initially reviewed by his immediate superior and assigned 
to Bruderer. The requisition forms, when filled out, went 
to Bruderer's immediate superior, a Mr. Gardner, for his 
review, approval and signature. Bruderer's sole non-
clerical function was recommending various types or 
brands of school furniture and fixtures for and estimating 
the aggregate cost of furnishing any given room in a spe-
cific seminary or institute. He had no control over pricing, 
.returning defective merchandise, paying or receiving 
merchandise he recommended. Requisitions filled in by 
Mr. Bruderer, when approved and signed by Mr. Gardner, 
went either directly to the Church Purchasing Department 
or first to the Church Building Department, depending 
upon whether the requested items were to go to a seminary 
or institute already built or one under construction. After 
Purchasing Department and/or Building Department ap-
proval, the Purchasing Department would prepare a pur-
chase order from the requisition. Only the Building 
and/or Purchasing and the Financial Departments were 
involved in the transaction from the time the requisition 
left Mr. Gardner's office. (R. 41-43, 60-64, 100-105, 109-
114, 211) Bruderer had no authority to sign any instru-
5 
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ments, papers or documents during this period nor did he 
have any authority in financial matters. (R. 44, 60, 101-
104) 
During the period of time relevant to this action, 
Bruderer officed in various buildings in Salt Lake City. 
He (in common with thousands of Church employees) 
could be reached by telephone through an extension of the 
L.D.S. Church central switchboard. (R. 40, 99, 100) The 
suite in which Bruderer's office was located was identi-
fied as housing some offices of the Seminaries and Insti-
tutes Department of the Church Education System. He 
was paid during this period of time by Corporation of the 
President as were some 6,000 persons, including employees 
of several separately incorporated entities such as hos-
pital, welfare, and social service corporations. He was 
actually hired by the Church Board of Education. (R. 195 
etseq.) 
The first of the four (4) promissory notes executed by 
Kerry-Aldon, Inc. in favor of the Bank and secured by 
collateral assignments of invoices including some of those 
at- the Church \ Purchasing Department, in the amount 
of $14,280.00, was dated on or about August 14, 1968, 
and was allegedly secured by unspecified "Invoices to LDS 
Church Department of Seminaries and Institutes totaling 
$18,978.36". This note was satisfied 2 months after it 
became overdue by an involuntary offset against the bank 
account of Kerry-Aldon, Inc. (not Kerry-Aldon Associ-
ates) on or about January 13, 1969. (R. 171) Various 
amounts were paid on the other three promissory notes 
from different sources and at various and sundry times. 
6 
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One of the Church^ invoices purportedly assigned 
to the Bank was allegedly No. 1171 in the amount of some 
$34,966.00. This invoice did not exist at the time of its 
alleged assignment. (R. 54-59) It was at that time a blank 
invoice form in the office of Mr. Cook. It was later used 
but the total amount thereof was $85.00. (Exhibit 22-D) 
The so-called assignment of invoice No. 1171 was by 
Aldon Cook, individually, and not Kerry-Aldon, Inc. 
(Exhibit 4-P-E) 
Mr. Cook failed to make good on his promise to see 
that the Bank's name was included on all of the Churches 
invoices. None of the Seminaries and Institutes or Build-
ing Department invoices were made payable to the Bank 
and Kerry-Aldon, Inc., jointly. Bruderer did not notify 
anyone anent the purported assignmentJ(R. 108-109) 
None of the assignments, invoices, acknowledgments 
or other documents, letters, papers or instruments involved 
in the transactions hereinabove described purport to re-
late to Corporation of the President, the defendant here-
in, nor was there any consideration given Corporation of 
the President or the Church for any of the "acknowledg-
ments". 
In October 1969, the President of the Bank, Mr. 
Norton Parker, sent a letter to Mr. Bruderer calling to 
his attention that the Bank had received no jointly pay-
able checks pursuant to the "assignments" and requesting 
that that situation be corrected. (Exhibit 10-P) Some time 
later the Bank also obtained a general assignment of all 
Kerry-Aldon, Inc.'s accounts receivable and filed a fi-
nancing statement covering the same in the office of the 
7 
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Utah Secretary of State but apparently made no attempt 
to give either the Church or Corporation of the President 
notice thereof. (Exhibit 6-P) 
All checks issued by Corporation of the President 
relative to\m invoices purportedly assigned^by Bank of 
Salt Lake were deposited to the account of Kerry-Aldon, 
Inc. at Bank of Salt Lake, and, during the relevant time 
period, there were funds in said account sufficient to 
cover the aforementioned promissory notes as they be-
came due. (Exhibits 16-D, 18-D) 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE LOWER COURT COMMITTED REVERS-
IBLE ERROR IN ITS JUDGMENT BECAUSE 
DEFENDANT WAS NOT A PARTY TO ANY 
OF THE TRANSACTIONS AT ISSUE. 
It is elementary that one who is not a party to 
an agreement cannot be bound by the terms thereof. 
Thus, according to 17 Am Jur 2d, Contracts §§294-295: 
As a general thing obligation of contracts is limited 
to the parties making them, and ordinarily, only 
those who are parties to contracts are liable for 
their breach. Parties to a contract cannot thereby 
impose any liability and in any event, in order to 
bind a third person contractually, an expression of 
assent by such person is necessary. 
It is also elementary that a debtor who has not been 
notified of an assignment cannot be bound by its terms. 
8 
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Section 70A-9-318, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as 
amended, provides in part: 
The account debtor is authorized to pay the assig-
nor until the account debtor receives notification 
that the account has been assigned and that pay-
ment is to be made by the assignee. A notifica-
tion which does not reasonably identify the rights 
assigned is ineffective. 
While the plaintiff dealt with and named various 
persons and entities in the instruments, papers, and docu-
ments comprising the subject transactions, nowhere is the 
defendant named as a party thereto. Where in any of the 
transactions of which plaintiff makes isue does the name 
of the defendant appear? Where in any of the instruments 
documents, or papers upon which plaintiff relies is the 
name of the defendant set forth? Where is any notice upon 
which plaintiff relies directed to the defendant? If plain-
tiff claims the defendant entered into a agreement, where 
is the agreement to which the defendant is a party? If the 
plaintiff intended to deal with and give notice to defend-
ant, why didn't it address its various letters and docu-
ments to defendant? 
All of the aforementioned questions must be an-
swered in favor of the defendant. Whatever parties the 
plaintiff chose to identify as being involved in the subject 
transactions, it did not identify the defendant. The failure 
of plaintiff in this respect leads to the inescapable conclu-
sion that plaintiff did not consider nor intend defendant to 
be a part of or involved in any manner in the subject trans-
actions. Naming of the defendant in this action is an after-
thought, an attempt of plaintiff to escape the effects of its 
9 
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own negligence in failing to make necessary inquiry, fail-
ing to draft its own documents and instruments with a 
sufficient degree of intelligent precision, and failing to 
avoid the consequences of its acts and omissions when such 
avoidance was within its power. 
As to the defendant, all the papers, documents and 
instruments offered by the plaintiff were irrelevant and 
incompetent, especially the letters from the Bank to Brud-
erer. 29 Am Jur 2d, Evidence § 836. These letters also 
come within the general rule that correspondence of third 
persons, where offered as proof of the facts therein stated, 
fall within the purview of, and thus may be subject to 
exclusion under, the hearsay evidence rule. 29 Am Jur 2d, 
Evidence § 881. 
POINT II 
THE LOWER COURT COMMITTED REVERS-
IBLE ERROR IN FINDING THAT SUCH 
AGENCY RELATIONSHIP EXISTED BE-
TWEEN DEFENDANT AND BRUDERER SO 
AS TO CHARGE DEFENDANT AS ADJUDG-
ED. 
The defendant is a Utah corporation sole. (Exhibit 
12-D) The creation of the relation of principal and agent 
by such corporation is governed by Section 16-7-8, Utah 
Code Annotated, 1953, which provides: 
All deeds and other instruments of writing shall 
be made in the name of the corporation, signed by 
the person representing the corporation in the 
official capacity designated in the articles of in-
corporation, or by a duly authorized agent or agents 
10 
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desigitated and named in a certificate filed by such 
corporation in the office of the secretary of state, 
and sealed with the seal of the corporation; an im-
pression of which seal shall be filed in the office 
of the secretary of state. The authority of any agent 
or agents designated as herein provided shall con-
tinue until revoked. A corporation sole designating 
an agent or agents to sign deeds and instruments 
of writing by certificates may revoke such authority 
by filing a notice of revocation of authority in the 
office of the secretary of state. (Emphasis added) 
The evidence before the Court indicates that Leland 
R. Bruderer was not a duly authorized agent designated 
and named in any certificate referred to in Section 16-7-8, 
supra (Exhibit 12-D); therefore, the defendant cannot be 
bound by any acts of the said Bruderer. Plaintiff is charged 
with knowledge and had constructive notice of this statute, 
the absence of such certificate and hence the lack of au-
thority of Bruderer. 
Assuming, nevertheless, for purposes of argument 
that the aforementioned law does not limit the creation 
of an agenqr by the corporation sole to the method pro-
vided in such statute, it is submitted that no actual or 
apparent agency existed between defendant and Bruderer. 
The evidence fails to establish any contract or appoint-
ment of Bruderer to represent defendant in contractual or 
business relations with third persons, it being fundamental 
that agency always connotes commercial or contractual 
dealings between two parties by and through the medium 
of another. 3 Am Jur 2d, Agency § 2. 
The lower court committed prejudicial error in find-
ing that the "* * * defendant clothed its employee and 
11 
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agent, Leland Bruderer, with apparent authority to per-
form the acts which he performed including acknowledg-
ment of plaintiffs assignment, that plaintiff was entitled 
to and did rely upon Mr. Bruderer's acknowledgments 
and the loss complained of by plaintiff resulted/' (Find-
ing of Fact No. 8, R. 322) The finding is not only vague, 
general, and begs the ultimate question; it is unsupported 
by the evidence and contrary to law. 
It is well settled that apparent authority is not to be 
determined from the acts or statements of an agent, but 
only from the acts or statements of a principal. This Court, 
in the case of Leavitt v. Courturier (Utah) 23 P.2d 1101, 
quoted with approval the following: 
The apparent power of an agent is to be 
determined by the acts of the principal and not by 
the acts of the agent; a principal is responsible for 
the acts of an agent within his apparent authority 
only where the principal himself by his acts or 
conduct has clothed the agent with the appearance 
of authority, and not where the agent's own con-
duct has created the apparent authority. 
See also Torrence National Bank v. Enesco Federal Credit 
Union (Cal.) 285 P.2d 737; Christian et al v. Rice Growers 
Association of California (Cal.) 123 P.2d 534; Start v. 
Shell Oil Co. (Oregon) 260 P.2d 468; Cignetti v. Ameri-
can Trust Company (Cal.) 294 P.2d 490; Perkins v. Wil-
lacy (Alaska) 431 P.2d 141; 2A CJ.S. Agency § 161. 
Again in Malin et al v. Giles et al 100 Utah 502, 114 
F.2d 208, this Court stated: 
The extent of an agent's apparent authority 
is not measured by the extent of power exercised 
12 
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by the agent; but by the principal's conduct with 
reference to the power exercised by the agent. 
Either by action or by inaction where there is a 
duty to act, the principal may create a situation 
the reasonable interpretation of which, by a third 
party with whom the agent is about to deal, is 
such as to lead that third party to believe that the 
agent has authority to deal with him as contem-
plated. Under such circumstances the law will 
hold the principal responsible to that third party 
for the results of that deal with the agent. But the 
conduct of the principal must be such as occurs 
prior to the deal, and not subsequent thereto. The 
latter conduct may have evidentiary value as a 
recognition by the principal of his former conduct, 
or may evidence a waiver of his right to object to 
lack of authority in his agent; but to be the induce-
ment for the third party to enter into an agree-
ment with the agent, the conduct must occur prior 
to the agreement. 2 C.J.S. Agency § 96. 
In furtherance of the foregoing principle, it has been 
stated that there are three prereqviisites to the establish-
ment of apparent authority: 
In order to establish that an agent had the 
apparent authority to do the act in question, it 
must be established (1) that the principal has mani-
fested his consent to the exercise of such authority 
or has knowingly permitted the agent to assume 
the exercise of such authority; (2) that the third 
person knew of the facts and, acting in good faith, 
had reason to believe, and did actually believe, 
that the agent possessed such authority; and (3) 
that the third person, relying on such appearance 
of authority, has changed his position and will be 
injured or suffer loss if the act done or transaction 
executed by the agent does not bind the principal. 
13 
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3 Am Jur 2d, Agency § 75; See also 2A CJ.S. Agency 
§§ 161-163. 
Proof of each of the foregoing requisites of apparent 
authority is lacking in this case. There is no evidence upon 
which a finding could be made that the defendant con-
sented to the acts of Bruderer in accepting the Bank let-
ters (Exhibits 2-P-Q 3-P-Q 4-P-C, 5-P-C) and his execut-
ing the same, or that defendant knowingly permitted 
Bruderer to assume the exercise of such authority. Nor 
does it appear in the record that Bruderer had ever been 
authorized in the past to acknowledge corporate indebted-
ness, agree to and accept notice of assignments of corporate 
debt, or draw and mail corporate checks on behalf of de-
fendant. 
It would seem elementary that a course of conduct 
of a particular character does not exist where there is a 
total absence of any conduct whatsoever of the character 
claimed. In this case there is no evidence of any prior 
dealing whatsoever between the plaintiff and defendant; 
and there is no act whatsoever on the part of defendant 
which would constitute ratification of the conduct of Brud-
erer in his receipt and execution of the Bank letters. 
Assuming further for purposes of argument, and 
despite the record, that some course of prior dealing had 
occurred, it is submitted that a finding of apparent au-
thority based upon earlier dealings requires that the prior 
dealings must be of the same character as the act under 
which it is claimed the principal is bound, and a required 
degree of repetitiveness. 
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Thus, in the case of Bennett v. Royal Union Mutual 
Life Insurance Co. (Mo.) 112 S.W.2d 134, the Court stated: 
Where previous acts done by the agent with 
the acquiescence of his principal are relied upon 
to establish apparent authority of the agent to do 
the act in question, the prior acts shown in evi-
dence must be of the same kind and character as 
the act with which it is sought to charge the prin-
cipal.* * * (Citing cases and treatise) 
In Jennings et al v. Pittsburgh Mercantile Company 
(Pa.) 202 A.2d 51, the principle was stated as follows: 
Focusing on the first of these factors, in order 
for a reasonable inference of the existence of ap-
parent authority to be drawn from prior dealings, 
these dealings must have (1) a measure of similar-
ity to the act for which the principal is sought to be 
bound, and, granting this similarity, (2) a degree 
of repetitiveness. * * * (Citing cases) 
Wewerka et al v. Lanton (Texas) 174 S.W.2d 630, 
quotes with approval the following: 
In 2 C.J.S., Agency, P. 1214, § 96, on the 
question of apparent authority, we find this lan-
guage: " Of course, no apparent authority ground-
ed upon a course of conduct is assemble in the 
absence of even a single precedent act or trans-
action to manifest the existence of the power claim-
ed; a course of conduct of a particular character 
does not exist where there is an utter absence of 
any conduct whatsoever of the character supposed." 
In this connection it has been said: "* * * The ap-
pearance of authority in one respect does not extend to 
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other acts which are not of a like nature.* * *" Con-
tinental - St. Louis Corporation v. Ray Scharf Vending 
Company, Inc. (Mo.) 400 S.W.2d 467. 
And further: M* * * In any event a course of deal-
ings is necessary to establish apparent authority. Isolated 
or occasional transactions are not enough.* * *" Bogue 
Electric Manufacturing Company v. Coconut Grove Bank 
269 F.2d 1. See also Ziv Television Programs, Inc. v. 
Associated Grocers Inc., of South Carolina (S.C.) 114 S.E. 
2d 826. 
The attention of the Court is invited to the foregoing 
cases of Bennett, Jennings, Wewerka, Continental - St. 
Louis, Bogue and Ziv, for not only the rules quoted, but 
also for the reasoning which resulted in the rejection of 
claims comparable to those here pressed by the plaintiff 
Bank. 
The record shows that Bruderer had certain duties 
with the Seminaries and Institutes of the Church Educa-
tional System, relating and limited to the collection of 
basic payroll information, the estimation of the cost of 
furnishing seminary and institute rooms and the prepara-
tion of requisitions and the evaluation of specifications of 
merchandise for use in the Seminary and Institute system. 
The record does not show that Bruderer had any authority 
to accept and agree to assignments, execute acknowledg-
ment of corporate debt, or agree to the payment of that 
debt. 
The duty to prepare but not sign requisitions, obtain 
and prepare payroll information of Seminary and Insti-
tute personnel, and evaluate cost and other specifications 
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of merchandise, are hardly sufficient to reasonably war-
rant that Bruderer was one upon whom notice of assign-
ments could be given, one who could execute acknowledge-
ment of corporate debt, or who could agree to the method 
of payment of that debt. There is no evidence to indicate 
that Bruderer had any authority to manage or direct the 
affairs of defendant generally or to handle defendant's 
financial matters. Bruderer's duties were limited in nature 
and confined geographically to his office; he was a sub-
ordinate in a long-line of persons in a hierarchy of the 
Seminaries and Institutes Department, a part of the Church 
Educational System, in turn one of many departments of 
the Church. 
To equate Bruderer's sole management responsibili-
ties—supervising a full and part time secretary in one lim-
ited functional area of Seminaries and Institutes of the 
aforementioned hierarchy—with those of one having gen-
eral management and fiscal responsibilities for all of an 
organization's activities within a given geographical area» 
as plaintiff has attempted to do, is absurd. 
No inference that Bruderer had the authority plain-
tiff claims for him arose from his position with Seminaries 
and Institutes. Bruderer had, by virtue of said position, 
only the authority to do things which persons in analogous 
positions in his locality, trade, or occupation and time 
customarily did. Restatement, Second, Agency, p. 106, 
§ 49 Comment c. The Bank, as Cook's principal in dealing 
with Bruderer, had imputed notice of the latter's lack of 
actual and apparent authority. Except for imputed knowl-
edge from its agent Cook, the Bank had absolutely no 
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knowledge of Bruderer or his position with Seminaries 
and Institutes. As to the defendant, Bruderer had no posi-
tion from which Cook or the Bank could infer agency of 
any nature whatsoever. 
As noted heretofore, among the requisites in estab-
lishing apparent authority, it must be shown that the third 
person knew of the facts, and acting in good faith, had 
reason to believe, and did actually believe, that agent 
possessed such authority; and that the third person has 
relied upon such appearance, and changed his position. 
3 Am Jur 2d, Agency § 75. 
No evidence indicates that plaintiff knew of any act 
of the defendant, nor did it rely upon any act of defendant, 
in its dealings in question. The record shows that it relied 
upon Cook alone for any information relating to the ques-
tion of agency. Indeed, the Findings of Fact as entered 
in this case are devoid of any finding that plaintiff relied 
upon any conduct of the defendant whatsoever in entering 
into the subject transaction. (R. 321-323) The reason for 
the absence of such an essential finding is clear: Plaintiff 
knew of no facts which would give appearance of author-
ity, because there were none, and of course could not have 
relied upon some non-existant conduct, and did not. 
The evidence indicates that plaintiff did not even 
know the nature of Bruderer's position at the time the 
subject transactions took place. In fact as late as October 
13, 1969, at which time plaintiff sent a letter to Bruderer, 
plaintiff was under the erroneous assumption that payment 
of accounts payable originated from Bruderer's office, 
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(Exhibit 10-P), further indicating the negligent manner 
in which plaintiff had entered into the subject trans-
actions. 
Not only is there an absence of a prior course of con-
duct of defendant which might mislead plaintiff to the 
extent of authority, if any, of Bruderer, but in fact the 
acts of defendant negative such authority, and placed 
plaintiff on a duty of inquiry. 
It is fundamental that a third person cannot assert an 
apparent authority effective as against a principal where 
there is a failure to discover the true state of the agent's 
powers. 2A C.J.S. Agency § 162. 
According to the case of Dohrmann Hotel Supply 
Co. v. Beau Brummel, Inc. 99 Utah 188, 103 P.2d 650: 
* * # One dealing with a supposed agent is under 
the duty to ascertain just what his capacity is.* * * 
The treatise 2A C.J.S. Agency § 168 states: 
The fact of dealing with one who claims or 
is known to be acting as agent is in itself a signal 
of danger, calling for the exercise of caution; and 
a person so dealing assumes the risk which may 
be involved, despite the difficulty of ascertain-
ment in some cases as to the extent of the power. 
Such a person is chargeable with notice of the 
authority and powers of the agent. The law holds 
him bound to know or discover them, and deems 
him, in the absence of such investigation or infor-
mation, as dealing at his peril, on the question of 
whether his dealings come within the authority. 
Ignorance of the extent of authority affords no ex-
cuse to one who deals with the agent outside of its 
limits. 
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In applying this rule, it has been held that no 
one is bound to deal with an agent, and, that where 
anyone does so as to matters beyond the actual 
authority conferred, any trust and confidence as to 
such matters is reposed by him and not by the 
principal, so that where one of two innocent parties 
must suffer from the wrongful acts of a third 
person, that one must bear the loss who by a con-
fidence reposed in the person acting wrongfully 
has made it possible. 
Litchfield v. Green (Ariz.) 33 P.2d 290; Ernst et ux v. 
Searle (Cal.) 22 P.2d 715; Brutinel v. Nygren (Ariz.) 154 
P. 1042. 
In the instant case the plaintiff Bank made no inquiry 
whatsoever of defendant regarding the authority, if any, 
of Bruderer. The only contact was with Aldon Cook —-
hardly discharging the duty incumbent upon plaintiff to 
inquire of defendant to ascertain the extent and character 
of the authority of any claimed agent. While inquiry of an 
alleged agent will not discharge the duty of inquiry, in 
this case the plaintiff did not even inquire of Burderer! 
See C.J.S. Agency § 169- It is submitted that the Bank, 
a sophisticated lender, has no excuse for not meeting a 
standard of inquiry equal to the ordinary business prud-
ence test, especially in view of the fact that the transactions 
involved an initial dealing with Bruderer. 
Plaintiff's negligence is further indicated by its rely-
ing upon Cook for purposes of determining to whom the 
so-called acknowledgement letters should be directed, and 
having Cook deliver the same to Bruderer, and secure his 
signature. It is submitted that such action by the plain-
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tiff constituted Cook its agent for such purposes and 
charges plaintiff with knowledge of Bruderer's statement 
that he did not have authority to sign the letters, and that 
his act in so doing was adverse to the interests of a prin-
cipal, if any. 
The duty of plaintiff to inquire of defendant con-
tinued with subsequent transactions. The initial act of 
Bruderer in the subject chain of events occurred on August 
1, 1968, when he signed the first of the four so-called 
acknowledgement letters. (Exhibit 2-P-C). More than five 
months later, the plaintiff with full knowledge it had 
not received checks drawn to joint payees pursuant to the 
August 13, 1968 letter, and with further notice that dur-
ing the same five month period 35 checks drawn by de-
fendant in favor of Kerry-Aldon, Inc., in the total sum of 
approximately $12,185.00 had been deposited to the lat-
ter's account with plaintiff (Exhibit 26-D), nevertheless, 
on January 15, 1969, entered into a further transaction 
with Kerry-Aldon, Inc. following the same procedural pat-
tern, and without ascertaining of defendant or the Church 
what Bruderer's capacity, if any, was. 
More than seven months after the August 13, 1968 
transaction, the plaintiff with full knowledge it had not 
received checks drawn to joint payees pursuant to the 
August 13, 1968 and January 15, 1969 letters, and with 
equal knowledge that certain invoices enumerated in the 
latter letter bore dates of October 10, 1968, and with 
further notice that during the same seven month period 
over 62 checks drawn by defendant in favor of Kerry-
Aldon, Inc., the total thereof exceeding $21,522.00, had 
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been deposited to the latter's account writh plaintiff (Ex-
hibit 26-D), nevertheless, on March 17 and March 26, 
1969, entered into further transactions with Kerry-Aldon, 
Inc. following the same procedural pattern, and without 
ascertaining of either the Church or defendant the extent 
of Bruderer's authority, if any. 
When plaintiff directed Cook to take the so-called 
acknowledgement letters to Bruderer, plaintiff did not 
attach loan documents or invoices to allow for verifica-
tion of the information represented in the letters. The 
debt represented in the letters and "acknowledged" by 
Bruderer exceeded the amount of the invoices; further-
more, the plaintiff had Bruderer "acknowledge" a debt 
twice, although represented by a single invoice, and also 
acknowledge a debt due by a vendor which had no rela-
tion to the Church. (Exhibit 5-P-P) Plaintiff also had 
Bruderer "acknowledge" an assignment of an invoice and 
indebtedness thereon in the amount of $34,966.00 which 
invoice was non-existent. (No. 1171) (Exhibit 4-P-C) 
As a general rule, the knowledge of an agent may 
be imputed to the principal only in matters relevant to the 
agency. This rule is explained by one treatise as follows: 
. . . Knowledge acquired or notice received by an 
agent which does not pertain to the duties of the 
agent which does not relate to the subject matter 
of the employment, or which affects matters outside 
the subject matter of the employment, or which 
affects matters outside the scope of his agency is 
not chargeable to the principal unless actually 
communicated to him. In other words the knowl-
edge or notice must come to an agent who has 
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authority to deal in reference to those matters which 
the knowledge or notice affects. 
(3 Am Jur 2d, Agency § 276) 
Also, in order for the knowledge of one person to be 
imputed to another under the law of agency, the knowl-
edge must be of a person who is executing some agency, 
and not that of one acting merely in some ministerial ca-
pacity, such as servant or clerk. 
In the transactions out of which the instant case 
arose, Bruderer clearly had no authority to deal in refer-
ence to those matters which the notice affected. The notice 
also quite obviously did not concern matters related to the 
subject matter of his employment or the scope of his 
agency, if any. 
The notices to Bruderer could not, therefore, be im-
puted to the defendant. 
Furthermore, the rule that notice to an agent is notice 
to the principal does not apply where the circumstances are 
such as to raise a presumption that the agent will not 
transmit his knowledge to his principal. 
One treatise has elaborated upon this exception to the 
rule as follows: 
Accordingly, the principal is not charged with such 
knowledge where the agent's personal interests 
would be effected if facts known to him were 
known to his principal; and the same result follows 
where the agent is more intent in furthering the 
interests of the opposite party than that of his prin-
cipal, or the agent acquires information that it 
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would be to his advantage to conceal from his 
principal. Even if there is apparent authority to 
receive notice on behalf of the principal, it is in-
effective where the person relying on it has knowl-
edge, or should have knowledge, that an adverse 
interest exists. (Emphasis added) 
(3 CJ.S. Agency, § 440, See also 3 Am Jur 206, 
Agency §83) 
In the instant case plaintiff's agent, Cook, not only 
was aware of circumstances that would have created a 
presumption that Bruderer would not transmit his infor-
mation to the Church, let alone to the defendant, but he 
had assured Bruderer that he (Cook) would himself act so 
as to make such communication unnecessary (R. 104). 
Obviously, it would not have been to Bruderer's ad-
vantage or in his interest to inform the Church or the 
defendant that he had exceeded his authority by acknowl-
edging corporate debt, especially non-existent or prospec-
tive debt, accepting notice of assignments, or agreeing 
to have checks issued to joint payees. 
It is equally clear that it would not have been to 
Cook's advantage or in his interest to convey Bruderer's 
lack of actual authority or the facts from which his lack 
of apparent authority could be determined to the plain-
tiff. But plaintiff rather than the Church or defendant 
should bear the loss because plaintiff selected Cook as its 
agent for the specific purpose of having the "acknowledg-
ments" executed and the "notice" delivered. Plaintiff 
accepted Cook's representation that Bruderer was the pro-
per addressee and signatory on behalf of the Church. 
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As noted, plaintiff through its agent Cook had 
knowledge that the acts of Bruderer in signing the so-
called acknowledgements were adverse to the interests of 
a principal, if any; and that certainly no act of defendant 
clothed Bruderer with any authority to acknowledge an 
indebtedness and assignment based upon a non-existent, 
if not fraudulent, invoice and certain other indebtedness 
unsupported in fact. 
Plaintiff's position is that defendant is bound by an 
agreement arising from the acts of Bruderer in signing 
the so-called acknowledgement letters. It is fundamental 
that consideration is an essential element of the validity 
of a contract. 17 Am Jur 2d, Contracts § 86. No considera-
tion supports the claimed agreement, and the same must 
be unenforceable against the defendant. 
Furthermore, the indebtedness which Bruderer is 
claimed to have acknowledged in the subject transactions 
was prospective. The evidence fails to indicate that there 
was any contract or purchase order of the vendees to pur-
chase the merchandise enumerated on the various invoices 
at the time of the so-called acknowledgments; further, the 
exhibits and testimony which relate to the transaction of 
March 26, 1969 (Exhibits 4-P-C, D, E) involving the non-
existent invoice No. 1171, indicate no such contract or 
purchase order was entered into, even subsequently. It 
is submitted that no person has the authority to acknowl-
edge prospective corporate indebtedness in behalf of an-
other, or to accept assignments thereof, and agree to pay 
that indebtedness. 
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It is submitted that Bruderer was not the actual, 
apparent, nor agent by estoppel of defendant; and that 
in any event the acts of Bruderer upon which plaintiff 
relies fall outside the scope of any possible duties which 
Bruderer may have performed in connection with his 
position with Seminaries and Institutes of the Church 
Educational System. 
POINT III 
THE LOWER COURT COMMITTED REVERS-
IBLE ERROR IN ADJUDGING DEFEND-
ANT LIABLE FOR AMOUNTS IN EXCESS 
OF THE BALANCE UNDER THE SECURED 
NOTES. 
The lower court committed additional prejudicial 
error in adjudging defendant liable for amounts in excess 
of the balance due under the three notes secured by the 
assignments. The assignments were given as collateral, 
and the balance including interest under the notes thus 
secured is $49,558.31. (See Exhibits 1-P; 3-P-D; 4-P-D; 
5-P-D) The lower court held the defendant liable for the 
aggregate amount of the assignments, $59,205.80, appar-
ently under the theory that any assigned sums in excess 
of the balance due under the three secured notes should 
be available to discharge other indebtedness in favor of 
the Bank which had been incurred subsequently by Kerry-
Aldon, Inc. An analysis of this other indebtedness indi-
cates it was incurred over a year after the 1969 transactions 
involving the assignments (Exhibits 7-P-B; 8-P-C; 9-P-B), 
and in one instance involved indebtedness of individuals 
and not the assignor, Kerry-Aldon, Inc. (Exhibit 8-P-C). 
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Section 70A-9-504 (2), Utah Code Annotated, pro-
vides: 
(2) If the security interest secures an in-
debtedness, the secured party must account to the 
debtor for any surplus, and, unless otherwise 
agreed, the debtor is liable for any deficiency. 
The complaint of plaintiff sought recovery of 
$43,486.00, attorney fees, and costs, based upon the bal-
ance due under the three notes executed in 1969 (R. 214-
215). Over objection of the defendant, the lower court 
allowed plaintiff to amend its complaint, pursue the issues 
of additional indebtedness, and advance an additional 
theory of recovery. (R. 80) 
It is submitted that, assuming the validity of the as-
signments in question and any liability of the defendant 
thereunder, the liability should not exceed the balance 
under the three notes. (Exhibits 3-P-D; 4-P-D; 5-P-D). 
POINT IV 
THE LOWER COURT COMMITTED REVERS-
IBLE ERROR IN HOLDING DEFENDANT 
LIABLE WHEN PLAINTIFF HAD A RIGHT 
OF OFFSET AGAINST KERRY-ALDON, INC. 
It is a legal maxim that in the case where one of two 
innocent persons must suffer injury or damage, the party 
whose acts or omissions caused or permitted the injury or 
damage to occur should bear the burden thereof. In the 
instant case the Bank is far from an innocent party but 
even if it were it still should not prevail. The Bank and 
Aldon Cook, whom it sent to Bruderer, sought mutual 
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economic advantage in entering into the transactions 
which are the basis of this case. Defendant had nothing 
whatsoever to gain from the transactions. The Bank and 
Cook initiated the transactions and prepared all the docu-
ments. For this reason the Bank should bear the loss. 
As the loans to Cook were supervised by an Assist-
ant Vice President of the Bank, it should have been aware 
of the financial condition of its debtor. The Bank could 
have avoided loss resulting from its debtor's insolvency 
had it exercised its right of offet when the notes became 
due, as there were at those times ample funds to cover 
the notes. (Exhibit 16-D). Farmers & Merchants Bank v. 
Universal C.LT. Cr. Corp. 6 Utah 2d 413, 315 P.2d 653; 
10 Am Jur 2d, Banks §666. It could have avoided ex-
tending the credit evidenced by the later notes at all had 
it properly supervised the Kerry-Aldon, Inc. account. The 
Bank would have been required to have exercised this right 
to protect a surety or indorser if it knew that Kerry-Aldon, 
Inc. was insolvent, and it certainly was aware that Kerry-
Aldon, Inc. wasn't paying its debts as they matured — one 
test of insolvency. Surely an account debtor should be 
similarly protected. 10 Am Jur 2d, Banks § 680. 
The failure of the Bank to exercise its right of off-set 
in order to collect the notes as they became overdue was a 
direct proximate cause of the plaintiff's losses. The doc-
trine of avoidable consequences precludes plaintiff's re-
covery for these loans. 
The law does not shift to a defendant a requirement 
to pay damages for all of the consequences which flow 
from his wrongful act or omission. Failure of a plaintiff 
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to take reasonable action to limit damages will result in 
the disallowance of damages for those consequences which 
the plaintiff could have reasonably avoided. This doctrine 
applies in contractual matters as well as in tort cases. Acts 
which have been construed by the courts as "reasonable" 
in the context of the nvoiHn nrer doctrine of^consequences 
include entering into subsequent contracts and the ex-
penditure of reasonable sums of money to avoid larger 
losses. In the instant case, plaintiff could have avoided 
all the losses of which it complains merely by properly 
monitoring all its loans and collecting all of them by offset 
as it did the loan made by it in August 1968—merely by 
acting in a commercially reasonable manner. (22 Am Jur 
2d, Damages §§ 30-37; 25 C.J.S. Damages §§ 33, 34) 
POINT V 
THE LOWER COURT COMMITTED REVERS-
IBLE ERROR IN HOLDING DEFENDANT 
LIABLE IN VIEW OF DEFICIENCIES IN THE 
DOCUMENTS UPON WHICH PLAINTIFF 
RELIES. 
There were numerous flaws and discrepancies in 
the collateral assignments and other documents prepared 
by the Bank and which should thus be construed strictly 
against the Bank. Some of these flaws and discrepancies 
which will now be noted go to the validity of the docu-
ments. 
In the January 15, 1969, transaction, (Exhibit 3-P) 
the purported assignment fails to designate the defendant 
as the account debtor. The designation of the signatory 
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of this assignment as Kerry-Aldon, Inc. had been added in 
pen, perhaps after the instrument was executed. The let-
ter from the Bank to Bruderer refers to the assignor as 
Kerry-Aldon Associates rather than Kerry-Aldon, Inc. 
and is directed to Seminaries and Institutes, LDS Church. 
Bruderer's title under his signature was supplied after 
Bruderer had signed the "acknowledgment", by an un-
known person. (R. 106, 107) The Bank's practice in 
these matters was to secure notes by the collateral assign-
ment of accounts with face value of approximately 133% 
of the note amount (R. 95) It is apparent, therefore, that 
other invoices must have been assigned to secure this Jan-
uary 15, 1969, promissory note. The balance currently 
due on this note is $6,030.79. Only 13 of the 19 invoices 
covered by the January 15, 1969 assignment were entered 
into evidence by the Bank. (Exhibit 3-P-F through 3-P-R) 
These 13 were all sold to the LDS Church Building De-
partment rather than Seminaries and Institute Division of 
the Church Educational Department. 
This note was taken only 2 days after the August 
13, 1968 note had been satisfied by involuntary offset 
against Kerry-Aldon, Inc.'s checking account at the Bank. 
(Exhibit 16-D, R. 171) The 1968 note was apparently 60 
days overdue and none of the $18,978.36 worth of in-
voices of "LDS Church Department of Seminaries and 
Institutes" securing the note had been paid jointly but 
had in all probability been paid to Kerry-Aldon, Inc. 
None of these January transaction documents refer to or 
concern the defendant. 
In the March 17, 1969 transaction, the Bank's letter 
to Bruderer recited the assignment by Kerry-Aldon Associ-
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ates of certain numbered invoices totaling $10,192.04. 
(Exhibit 5-P-C) The note face amount was $14,000, again 
indicating that there was other security therefor. Despite 
this there is no evidence that any other security was ever 
realized on this note. The "acknowledgment" is dated 
March 15th, the note March 17th, and the "assignment" 
is undated. The Statement executed by Bruderer is^March 
16, 1969, before the loan was ever made. Of the 18 in-
voices listed by number in the Bank's letter, the Bank has 
furnished only 14, one of which was sold to Sevier School 
and Office Supply, a purchaser not related to defendant 
at all. The other invoices furnished indicate various ven-
dees such as LDS School Division; LDS Church Building 
Department; Church Building Department; Church of 
Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, School Division; San 
Bernardino District Seminaries; Church of Jesus Christ 
of Latter-day Saints, School Purchasing Division; none of 
them Seminaries and Institutes, LDS Church. The defend-
ant is not mentioned in any of the documents involved 
with the first March transaction. 
In regard to the March 26, 1969 transaction the 
Bank's letter to Bruderer also refers to Kerry-Aldon 
Associates as assignor. (Exhibit 4-P-C) Bruderer affixed 
his title as "Records and Budget". Someone else later 
printed below those words, "Records and Budget Officer". 
(R. 107) The assignment form used in the transaction did 
not identify specifically the invoice supposedly assigned 
— "invoice from Seminaries and Institutes, of L.D.S. 
Church" (Exhibit 4-P-C). Furthermore, the invoice 
allegedly assigned was a non-existent invoice No. 1171 
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in the imaginery amount of $34,966.00. Of course, no 
invoice was furnished with this set of documents. Defend-
ant is nowhere named or alluded to in these documents. 
The property right supposedly the subject of trans-
fer is not sufficiently identified under the assignment 
aforementioned, and is therefore ineffective. Section 70A-
9-318, U.C.A. 1953. It is also elementary that one cannot 
assign a non-existent right. It is even "generally held that 
an assignment of a right expected to arise uder a contract 
not yet formed, or employment not yet existing, is in-
effective to transfer such a prospective 'right'." 3 Willis-
ton on Contracts, § 413, p. 56. 
Further analysis indicates that the foregoing assign-
ment form was signed by Aldon Cook, individually, and 
not by Kerry-Aldon, Inc., the content of the assignment 
being here set forth: 
KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS: 
That the undersigned, for a valuable consid-
eration, receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged, 
hereby bargains, sells, assigns, transfers and sets 
over unto Bank of Salt Lake of Salt Lake City all 
the right, title and interest of the undersigned in 
and to the following to wit: Invoices from Semi-
naries & Institutes, of L.D.S. Church, hereby con-
stituting the said assignee as the true and lawful 
attorney in fact for the undersigned irrevocably to 
adopt and pursue all lawful ways and means to 
collect and enforce and recover and reduce to 
possession and ownership the property and rights 
hereby transferred. 
Dated this 26 day of March 1969. 
/ s / Aldon Cook 
(Exhibit 4-P-E) 
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It is obvious that a non-existent invoice in the imagi-
nary amount of $34,966.00 cannot be assigned, and cer-
tainly was not assigned by Kerry-Aldon, Inc., the only 
signature thereon being that of Aldon Cook individually. 
In the absence of such valid assignment the defendant 
should not be charged in said amount of $34,966.00; nor 
should defendant be charged in the additional amounts 
of the other "assignments" for the reasons here advanced. 
By letter dated April 22, 1969, Kerry-Aldon,, Inc/s 
main supplier, Artco Bell Corporation, informed^hini that 
it would require that the LDS Church make payment di-
rectly to it or no further merchandise would be shipped 
to the Church. (Exhibit 17-D). Kerry-Aldon, Inc. was 
required therein to give Artco Bell an assignment of all 
future invoices and a Power of Attorney. No one could 
be liable to the Bank for materials not specifically and 
validly assigned but especially could no one be liable on 
invoices which Artco Bell had a superior assignment. 
Bruderer obviously had no authority, actual, appar-
ent or otherwise, to acknowledge indebtedness on invoices 
which had already been paid at the time of their purported 
assignment. Nor could such invoices be effectively assign-
ed by any Kerry-Aldon entity. Given the week's lead time 
required by the Church to process requests for payment 
(R. 203), many of the invoices purportedly assigned by a 
Kerry-Aldon entity had been paid prior to the assign-
ment. For example, note invoices number 1026, 1031, 
1040, 1041, 1043, 1089, (Exhibits 3-P-E and 24-D). It also 
appears that some invoices were assigned before they were 
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actually created. See invoices numbers 1115 and 1047 
(Exhibits 3-P-E and 24-D). 
An examination of Exhibits 5-P-C, 5-P-E and 25-D 
indicates that invoices numbers 1036, 1148, 1151 and 
1154, at least, were paid prior to their alleged assignment. 
Comparing Exhibits 5-P-C and 3-P-E reveals that invoice 
number 1036 was assigned and "acknowledged" twice. 
Because the August, 1968, assignment did not list invoices 
by number and the March 21, 1969, acknowledgment re-
lating to the March 26, 1969 assignment listed the fic-
titious invoice number 1171 (Exhibits 4-P-C and 4-P-E), 
no further positive identification of invoices paid before 
their assignment or assigned more than once is possible. 
To add insult to injury the lower court did not only 
hold defendant liable for the full amount of the assign-
ments acknowledged by Bruderer and refused to grant 
defendant credit for amounts paid by others upon the 
promissory notes, despite the fact that the acknowledged 
amount included (1) invoices for materials purchased by 
entities not related to the Church or defendant and (2) 
duplicates of invoices to Church-related purchasers, (R. 
83, 84); but in a final touch of irony the lower court 
awarded the plaintiff attorney's fees according to the 
terms of the notes. (R. 373, R. 310) 
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CONCLUSION 
The judgment of the lower court should be reversed 
for the following reasons: 
1. The defendant was not named a party in any 
of the documents upon which plaintiff relies for its re-
covery in this case. It's suing the defendant is an after-
thought. 
2. Plaintiff could not rely upon the acts of Bruderer 
as an agent of defendant inofar as the acknowledgments, 
receipts of notice, and the agreements as to the method 
of payment were concerned because it had constructive 
notice of the requirements of Section 16-7-8 U.C.A. 1953, 
as amended, relative to the appointment of agents of 
corporations sole with the power to execute deeds and 
other written instruments. 
3. Leland R. Bruderer had neither the actual, ap-
parent nor estoppel authority to bind defendant by his 
acknowledgment and agreement as to how certain in-
debtedness would be paid. Bruderer's notice and knowl-
edge of the assignments, being outside the scope of his 
employment, should not be imputed to the defendant. 
4. The Banks' recovery against anyone but Cook, 
Rapp and the Kerry-Aldon entities is barred by its con-
tributory negligence in failing to inquire of the Secretary 
of State's office so as to properly determine how to deal 
with the defendant or to investigate the extent of Brud-
erer's authority, if any; in appointing Cook its agent for 
purposes of securing the acknowledgments and giving 
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notice of the assignment; in accepting the assignment of 
duplicate, stray, prepaid and imaginary invoices, in failing 
to properly supervise the loans to Kerry-Aldon entities 
so that it could collect them by offset when overdue, or at 
least make due inquiry why no monies had been received 
from the assignments. 
5. No liability could be charged to the defend-
ant on the general assignment of accounts receiv-
able filed by plaintiff with the Secretary of State's 
office, long after the due date of the last of the notes 
secured by invoices of any Church organization or entity, 
but of which the defendant was not given notice. 
6. No knowledge can be imputed to defendant by 
virtue of the acknowledgments relied upon by plaintiff 
because they are not addresed to defendant and thus could 
not have been reasonably calculated to give it notice of 
the assignments. 
7. Even if Bruderer had been the agent of defend-
ant with the authority to do the acts upon which plain-
tiff relies and even if defendant had been named as a 
party in the documents relied upon by plaintiff, plaintiff 
should not be allowed to prevail because the doctrine of 
avoidable consequences applies to its failure to collect 
the subsequent loans by offset as it had the August, 1968, 
assignment. 
8. In any event plaintiff's recovery should be limited 
to the amounts actually due on the promisory notes as the 
assignments were collateral assignments only. 
36 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
9. In no event should defendant be liable in the 
"phoney" invoice No. 1171 in the imaginary amount of 
$34,966.00. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RAYMOND W. GEE 
J. DOUGLAS MITCHELL 
of and for 
KIRTON, McCONKIE, 
BOYER & BOYLE 
336 South Third East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Defendant-
Appellant 
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